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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION 
upon the Charge of Violation of Section 
210.1 of the Civil Service Law 
2 A - 4 / 2 7 / 7 6 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. D-0120 
On October 26, 1975, Counsel to this Board filed a charge alleging 
that the Niagara County Community College Faculty Association (Association) 
violated CSL Section 210.1 "in that it caused, instigated, encouraged, 
condoned and engaged in a strike against the employer [Niagara County 
Community College] on September 17, 1975." In its answer, the Association 
denied that there had been a strike and argued "That on September 17, 1975, 
there were no unauthorized absences by members of the...Association", but 
that each of the employees who was absent on that day had exercised his 
contractual right to a day of personal leave. The contract then in force 
between the Association and the employer authorized three days personal leave 
subject to several pre-conditions. Previously personal leave day requests 
had always received pro forma approval from the employer, but the requests 
for personal leave on September 17, .!.1>975 were denied. Those requests had 
been made at the suggestion of the Association. The suggestion of the 
Association was a tactic in the course of negotiations for a successor agree-
ment. It was designed to disrupt the operations of the employer. One hundred 
nine of the one hundred sixty-eight members of the employer's faculty did 
absent themselves from class on September 17, 1975. That led to the cancel-
lation of 202 of 350 day session classes on that day. 
Board - D-0120 
In his report and recommendations, the hearing officer concluded 
that the mass absence constituted a strike. He proposed that the Association 
be penalized for violating CSL Section 210.1 and that the penalty reflect the 
limited impact of the strike upon the public welfare as well as the absence 
of extreme provocation. Having reviewed the record, we confirm the hearing 
officer's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the dues deduction privileges of the 
NIAGARA COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE FACULTY 
ASSOCIATION be suspended for a period of 
three months and that, if the employer does 
not normally deduct dues in equal monthly 
installments, it shall not deduct more than 
75% of the annual dues during the academic 
year 1976-77, provided, however, that until 
the Niagara County Community College Faculty 
Association affirms that it no longer asserts 
the right to strike against any government, 
no dues should be deducted on its behalf by 
the employer. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 27, 1976 .---"'"""' 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
nw 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TROY CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
TROY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
#2B~4/27/76 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1790 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Troy City School 
District (District) to a decision of a hearing officer finding it in violation 
of CSL Section 201-a.l(d). The violation, as found by the hearing officer, 
was that the District had failed to negotiate in good faith when it had refused 
to pay salary increments after June 30, 1975, as provided in the expired 1974-75 
contract, during the course of negotiations for a successor agreement. 
The Troy Teachers Association (TTA), the charging party herein, has been 
the representative of teachers and other certified personnel employed by the 
District going back to 1968. Since 1968 TTA and the District have negotiated a 
series of one-year agreements, each of which has provided a salary schedule re-
flecting annual increments and a salary increase. Until the 1974-75 school 
year, increments as set forth in the predecessor contract were paid at the start 
of the school year whether or not agreement on a successor contract had been 
reached. At the start of the 1974-75 school year, no increments under the 
expired 1973-74 contract were paid until a successor contract was agreed 
upon during October 1974— In past negotiations, the parties had 
negotiated a lump sum for salaries, part of which was then allocated 
by TTA to increments and the rest to a salary increase. This allocation 
process was subject to District approval. By reason of this procedure, the 
1/ The parties' stipulation setting forth the facts specifies that the successor 
contract was agreed upon during October 1975. This is obviously a mistake. 
The charge herein which relates to the negotiation of the 1975-76 agreement 
was filed on September 14, 1975. Moreover, pursuant to Section 214.1 of our 
Rules, a copy of the 1974-75 contract was filed with this Board. The con-
tract on file indicates that in final form it was executed on January 7,1975. 
4801 
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amounts of increments have varied from year to year. 
The question posed by the District's exceptions is whether, under the 
above-stated facts, there had been a past practice which had been disregarded 
by the District when it failed to pay increments at the beginning of the 
1975-76 school year. Both TTA and the District have submitted oral and 
written arguments in support of their respective positions in this matter. 
It was first articulated by us in Matter of Triborough Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority (5 PERB 3064 [1972]) that an employer may not unilaterally change 
terms and conditions of employment during negotiations for a new contract. 
Moreover, a salary schedule containing different salary steps that are 
related to the seniority and experience of an employee was, in the Triborough 
case, a past practice that could not be altered unilaterally by the employer 
during negotiations. This formulation of an employer's duty to negotiate in 
good faith has been restated by us in many cases, including Matter of Rockland 
County BOCES, 8 PERB 3025 (1975), In the latter case, this analysis was con-
firmed by the Appellate Division, Second Department (Rockland County BOCES v. 
PERB, ;50 AD 2d 832 [1975]), which modified the PERB determination on other 
grounds related to PERB's lack of authority to issue the remedial order that 
it had issued in that case). 
This Triborough doctrine, insofar as it applies to salary schedules 
providing for increments, has two bases. One is rooted in the nature of the 
salary schedule, which is a mathematical formula that is applicable to teachers 
in abstract and not in personal terms. For its purposes, teachers are 
anonymous but the salary of a teacher of specified seniority, experience and 
education is automatically ascertainable by checking the schedule. Any change 
in the teacher's seniority, experience or education may alter his salary 
4302 
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automatically without occasioning any change in the terms and conditions of 
employment provided by the contract. The other basis is personal. As stated 
in our Rockland County decision, it is rooted in the expectations of employees 
based upon "a long standing and continual practice of providing annual 
salary increments...." 
The stipulated facts are not sufficiently complete to permit us to apply 
—these—tests—in—the- instant—case-.— We—need—to—know-more—about—the—circumstances-
under which increments were paid at the opening of the 1974-75 school year. 
It may be that there was no longer a continual practice of providing annual 
increments. We also need to know more about the nature of the recurrent 
changes in the incremental aspect of the salary schedule. The absence of any 
rational relationship in the schedule of increments from year to year 
diminishes its reliability as a basis for employee expectations and reduces 
its significance for the purpose of the Triborough doctrine. It might also 
be useful to know if the 1974-75 incremental schedule was applied in determin-
ing the salaries of newly hired teachers while not applied to returning 
teachers, or if the District deemed the incremental schedule equally 
inapplicable to both groups. 
This matter should be remanded to the Hearing Officer to obtain a complete 
record and to reconsider his decision in the light of that record. 
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the Hearing 
Officer. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 27, 1976
 x _ , „ ,„„, , 
_ . ^ 1 
Robert D. Helsby,/Chairman 
fcoir 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2C-4/27/76 
In the Matter of 
EDWARD J. MORRIS, 
Petitioner. 
_-_and_-
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
PHILIP F. CORSO, Sheriff of Suffolk County, 
Employer. 
Case No. U-1688 
The charge herein was filed by Edward J. Morris on July 9, 1975 and 
alleges that Philip F. Corso, Sheriff of Suffolk County, violated CSL Sections 
209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) by subjecting Morris to injurious treatment by reason 
of his activities on behalf of the Suffolk County Deputy Sheriffs Benevolent 
Association (Association), an organization of which he was president. A 
hearing was held at which testimony was taken and documentary evidence submitted 
Thereafter, the hearing officer dismissed the charge upon his findings that the 
evidence did not establish any animus directed at the Association by Corso or 
his agents. The hearing officer properly reasoned that the existence of such 
animus as a cause for the allegedly injurious treatment of an employee is an 
essential element of a violation of Sections 209-a.l(a), (b) and (c). 
Morris has filed exceptions to the hearing officer's decision. In supporjt 
of his exceptions he submitted to us the brief that he had submitted to the 
hearing officer. Having read that brief and reviewed the record, we confirm 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the hearing officer. 
130" 
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ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the charge herein be, and hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: New York, New York 
April 27, 1976 
'ROBERT D. HEL'SBY Chairman 
^6SE/H R. CROWLEY y\/ 
;D L. DENSON 
'<*<• 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-4/27/76 
In the Matter of 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE CITY OF LONG BEACH, NEW YORK, INC. 
upon" t he" "Char"ge "of Viol/at ion" of" See tiro n~ 
210.1 of the C i v i l Serv ice Law. 
BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
-Ca-se-No-r-D^ QiQi+--
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the City of 
Long Beach (City) to a decision of a hearing officer granting 
a motion to dismiss its charge against the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the City of Long Beach, New York, Inc. (PBA). 
On August 8, 197 5 the Corporation Counsel of the City had issued 
a charge alleging that the PBA had violated CSL Section 210.1 on 
August 6, 7, and 8, 19 7 5 in that "said organization did cause, 
instigate, encourage and condone the actions of the members of saijd 
organization in abstaining, in whole or in part, from the proper 
performance of their duties in the normal manner without permission 
and did otherwise engage in a job action constituting a strike." 
The charge was amended on August 18, 1975 to specify more 
precisely the nature of the conduct that the City complained about 
and alleged to have constituted a strike. The essence of that 
conduct consisted of unusual and very strict enforcement of 
equipment requirements imposed by State law upon vehicles owned 
and/or operated by the City, the effect of which was to impair 
greatly the services rendered' by the City's transportation and 
sanitation departments. 
'4b%3 mm 
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The reasoning of the hearing officer In dismissing the 
charge was that: "The policemen, however, did not withhold from 
the City any services that they were obligated to furnish as an 
expressed or implied term of their employment relationship with 
the City (footnote omitted)," 
The ruling on the motion was made before the conclusion of 
the City's case and before any of the PBA's case was presented. 
It was based upon certain assumptions of fact that the hearing 
officer communicated to the parties before ruling on the motion. 
Among the assumptions of fact was that 
"During the three days when summonses were being 
issued to City-owned and/or operated vehicles, 
members of Respondent continued to perform their 
other duties and did not otherwise withhold their 
services." 
DISCUSSION 
Having read the record and considered the written and oral 
arguments of the parties, we seek more information. The question 
raised by this' case is an unusual one and one of great importance. 
Among other things, we seek more information that would enable 
us. to ascertain the applicability of parts of §§200— and 210.2(b) 
1/ "The legislature of the state of New York declares that it is 
the public policy of the state and the purpose of this act to 
promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between 
government and its employees and to protect the public by 
assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninterrupted opera-
tions and functions of government..." (emphasis added) 
2/ "Presumption. For purposes of this subdivision an employee 
...who abstains wholly or in part from the full performance 
of his duties in his-normal manner without permission, on 
the date or dates when a strike occurs, shall be presumed to 




Board - D-0104 
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of the Taylor Law. These sections indicate the importance of 
establishing, among other things, whether the policemen abstained 
from the performance of any normal services or whether the 
issuance of tickets to city vehicles interfered with such 
performance. In order to establish such information, we 
ORDER that the decision of the hearing officer be and hereby 
is reversed, and the matter be remanded to the 
hearing officer. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 27, 1976 
D. Helsby/ Chairman 
<&$.. Cmd$ 
F r e d L, Denson 
iW 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF JOHNSON CITY, 
Respondent, 
- and -
LOCAL 921, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION 
-OF FIREFIGHTERSy- AFL=CIOy 
Charging Party. 
On February 9, 1976, the Village of Johnson City (Village) filed the 
charge herein alleging that Local 921, International Association of Fire-
fighters, AFL-CIO (Local 921) refused to negotiate in good faith in violation 
of CSL Section 209-a.2(b) by improperly insisting upon the negotiation of a 
matter that is not a mandatory subject of negotiations. The demand of Local 
921 alleged by the Village not to constitute a mandatory subject of nego-
tiations is for a minimum manpower standard of twelve paid firemen on duty at 
all times. That demand was first made during negotiations on May 29, 1975 and 
on September 8, 1975 it was presented to a factfinder appointed by this Board. 
On December 31, 1975, Local 921 filed a petition under Section 205.4 
of our Rules for arbitration of its impasse with the Village, including arbi-
tration of its demand for a minimum manpower standard. The Village, in its 
response to the petition filed pursuant to Section 205.5 of our Rules, objected 
to the arbitrability of the minimum manning demand, "maintaining that this is 
not a proper issue for arbitration." The instant charge followed three-and-a-
half weeks later. Our Rules provide at Sections 205.5 and 205.6(a): 
"§205.5 Compulsory Interest Arbitration; Response. 
(a) Filing. A response shall be filed within five 
working days of receipt of the petition requesting arbi-
tration. It shall be served upon the petitioning party 
s imul t aneous ly. « A A A 
#2E-4/27/76 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND 
ORDER 
CASE NO. U-2001 
Interim Board - U-2001 
-2 
(b) Contents. 
(1) Such response shall contain respondent's 
position regarding terms and conditions of employment 
not agreed upon. Proposed contract language may be 
attached. 
(2) The response may also raise objections to 
the arbitrability of any of the matters raised in 
the petition and to any statement in the petition 
alleging agreement as to terms and conditions of 
-• —employment-.— 
"205.6(a) A charge filed by either party alleging violation 
of section 209-a.l(d) or section 209-a.2(b) of the Act which 
raises questions of arbitrability will be accorded expedited 
treatment in the manner set forth in section 204.4 of these 
Rules. If filed by the respondent, such a charge may not be 
filed after the date of the filing of its response; if filed 
by the petitioner, such a charge may not be filed more than 
five working days after the receipt of the response." 
(emphasis supplied) 
Local 921, in reaction to the response of the Village, makes three 
points — 
1. A minimum manpower standard is a mandatory subject of negotiations. 
2. The charge was time-barred as it was filed more than four months after the 
minimum manpower demand was first made. 
3. The Village waived its right to object to the alleged non-mandatory nature 
of the minimum manpower standard. 
The matter has been accorded expedited treatment under Section 204.4 
of our Rules applicable to matters raising questions of scope of negotiations. 
However, it was agreed by the parties that the Board should first consider 
the question of whether the charge falls either by reason of being time-
barred or because the Village has waived its right to object to the alleged 
non-mandatory nature of the demand. The parties agreed that if we should 
resolve these issues, in favor of the Village, additional briefs would be 
submitted on the issue of the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of the demand. 
We have received and reviewed the briefs of the parties and wg £Pn~ 
4ol0 
elude that the charge should not be dismissed. We reject Local 921's argu-
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ments that the Village has waived its right to object to the non-mandatory 
nature of the minimum manpower demand and that the charge was time-barred by 
virtue of being brought more than four months after the alleged violation. As 
for the latter, we find no relevance in either May 29, 1975 or September 8, 197f , 
the dates when, according to Local 921, the demands were made. Section 205.6 
contemplates that a respondent may contest the negotiability of a demand as 
late as the date on which it files its response to a petition requesting 
arbitration. The reason for this is that the respondent may have consented to 
a non-mandatory subject being raised during negotiations and even during fact-
finding in the hope that a voluntary agreement would be achieved, but in the 
knowledge that nothing could, be imposed; thus, our Rules permit a respondent to 
challenge the mandatory negotiability of a demand for the first time when that 
demand is submitted to arbitration. 
As to the waiver objection, our Rules are so confusing and establish 
time limits that are so short that we concede them to be unreasonable. Taken 
together, Sections 205.5 and 205.6 compel a respondent to challenge the nego-
tiability of a demand simultaneously with, and not later than, its objection 
to the arbitrability of that demand. This must be done on our forms - presum-
ably not in the possession of the challenging party - within five working days 
of receipt of the petition for arbitration. If filed by mail, it must be done 
two days earlier. Moreover, the challenging party might be misled by the 
language of Section 205.5 into thinking that a protest to the arbitration panel 
1 
is an alternative to filing a charge with PERB. 
1. We will promulgate amendments to Rules 205.5 and 205.6 to extend the time 
limits and to resolve the ambiguities. 
Interim Board - U-2001 
ACCORDINGLY, we do not dismiss the charge and we direct the parties 
to submit their arguments on the merits within ten working days of receipt 
of this interim decision. 
Dated: New York, New York 
April 27, 1976 
>ert D. Helsby, Chairman 
Fred L.^Denson 
^7>— --* 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
P U B L - . EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In t h e Mat t e r of . . 
BOARD OF-EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
- a n d -
UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, NEA,. 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
- a n d -
DISTRICT COUNCIL 37 , AMERICAN FEDERATION OF 
STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO 
I n t e r v e n o r . 
# 2 F - 4 / 2 7 / 7 6 
-CASE NO.' C-1178 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AMD ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the -Public Employment Relations Board in accor-
dance with the Public.Employees' Fair Employment Act.and the 
Rules of Procedure .of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; . 
Pursuant to the- authority vested in 'the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 372, District Council 37, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO l . 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, -in the unit described, below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and1 the settlement of- grievances.-
Unit: 
I n c l u d e d : A l l i n s t r u c t o r s - a d d i c t i o n , i n s t r u c t o r s - n a r c o t i c s 
e d u c a t i o n , c o o r d i n a t o r s and a s s i s t a n t c o o r d i n a t o r s . . 
Excluded: L icensed t e a c h e r s , h o u r l y employees , d i r e c t o r s and 
a s s i s t a n t d i r e c t o r s . ,, 
F u r t h e r , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e a b o v e - n a m e d p u b l i - c e m p l o y e r 
s h a l l n e g o t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h Loca l 372, D i s t r i c t Counci l 37 , 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
and e n t e r i n t o a w r i t t e n a g r e e m e n t w i t h s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n 
\>i th r e g a r d t o t e r m s a n d c o n d i t i o n s o f e m p l o y m e n t , a n d s h a l l 
l e g o t i n t c c o l l e c t i v e l y w i t h ' s u c h e m p l o y e e o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t h e 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f , g r i e v a n c e s . 
S i g n e d o n t h e 27 th d a y o f A p r i l I Q 7 6 
~~-> 
ROBERT D. HELSBY, ' C h a i r m a n 
A /V 
\//titmJY UdtoMj 
/TO'SEP/H R. CROWLEY 
HitO-Lii* 
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